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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
WHITING v. STATE: STANDING FOR FOURTH 
AMENDMENT APPLICABILITY RESTS ON BOTH A 
SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND A 
REASONABLY OBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
THAT SOCIETY IS WILLING TO RECOGNIZE 
By: Peter McTernan 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in order to possess 
standing under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, a person 
must have both a subjective expectation of privacy and an objective 
expectation that society as a whole is willing to recognize. Whiting v. 
State, 389 Md. 334, 885 A.2d 785 (2005). In affirming the 
intermediate appellate court's decision, the Court held that, while 
having a subjective expectation of privacy, a squatter living in a 
publicly owned housing unit did not have a reasonably objective 
expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize. Id. 
When William Moore ("Moore") failed to report to work for two 
days, Baltimore City Police Officers responded to his home where 
they discovered that he had been murdered. While investigating the 
murder, detectives subpoenaed Moore's cellular phone records in 
order to determine if any calls had been made following his death. 
After tracing calls, that had in fact been made after Moore's death, 
police were able to track down a witness who believed that Wesley 
Whiting ("Whiting") had made calls from Moore's number. In 
addition, another one of Whiting's acquaintances informed police that 
Whiting lived at 810 East Preston Street in Baltimore City. While 
Whiting did in fact reside and keep personal property at the East 
Preston address, he was merely a "squatter" or trespasser in an 
abandoned property owned by the City of Baltimore. However, 
Whiting kept personal possessions and placed a lock on the bedroom 
door in an attempt to keep others from entering the room where he 
stayed. On April 27, and May 4, 2001, police executed search 
warrants where they subsequently discovered evidence of the murder 
of Moore. Whiting was then arrested and indicted on charges of, inter 
alia, first-degree murder. 
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At trial, Whiting moved to suppress the evidence obtained through 
the search warrants, arguing that by living at the residence, he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy and therefore had standing to contest 
the searches. The State countered, arguing that Whiting lacked 
standing because he was not a tenant or owner of the residence, rather 
a squatter who was merely trespassing on the property. As such, 
Whiting could not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. The State 
produced various pieces of evidence proving that the City of Baltimore 
owned the home and that Whiting actually had a number of other 
addresses where he had previously listed his residency. In ruling that 
Whiting lacked standing, the trial court reasoned that by squatting in a 
property owned by the city, he was trespassing and thereby 
committing a crime. The trial court further stated that, though 
trespassing is a fairly insignificant crime, one cannot expect that 
society should recognize any expectation of privacy for that trespasser, 
no matter how subjective, as being legitimate. Thereafter, Whiting 
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
After filing an appeal, arguing that the trial court had erred in 
denying his motion to suppress, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision stating, "because the 
Housing Authority could enter the premises or could permit anyone 
else to do so, and because [Whiting] had no right to exclude anyone 
from the premises ... any expectation of privacy [Whiting] had that the 
police would not enter was unreasonable." Whiting v. State, 160 Md. 
App. 285, 304, 863 A.2d 1017, 1027-28 (2004)). The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to address the issue of whether 
Whiting, by squatting in an abandoned, but publicly owned building, 
possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy, thus giving him 
standing to challenge the search warrants which produced evidence 
leading to his conviction for first-degree murder. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees a person the right to be secure 
in "their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." Whiting, 389 Md. at 346,885 A.2d 792 (citing 
United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2005)). In 
order for an individual to invoke protection under the Fourth 
Amendment, he or she must maintain a "legitimate expectation of 
privacy" in the house, papers, or effects searched or seized. Id. (citing 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of a person's expectation of privacy is gauged on societal 
acceptance and recognition of that expectation. Id. at 347, 885 A.2d at 
793 (citing Graham v. State, 47 Md. App. 287, 294, 421 A.2d 1385, 
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1389 (1980)). More specifically, the Supreme Court has defined a 
legitimate expectation of privacy as being, "[m]ore than a subjective 
expectation of not being discovered." Id. at 348, 885 A.2d at 793 
(citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)). 
In Katz, Justice Harlan created a two-prong test requiring the 
defendant seeking protection under the Fourth Amendment have both 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the place being searched and 
have that expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize, 389 
U.S. 347, 353 (J. Harlan, concurring). Twenty-one years later, in 
California v. Greenwood, the Court further expanded this holding by 
stating that "the person claiming protection under the Fourth 
Amendment must manifest a subjective expectation of privacy that is 
'objectively reasonable,''' 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
In determining whether an expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable, various factors, including whether the individual owned, 
leased, lawfully occupied, or rightfully possessed the premises, are 
considered. Whiting, 389 Md. at 351, 885 A.2d at 794-95 (citing 
Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153, 157, 161 A.2d 244, 245 (1932)). 
Accordingly, given the "squatting" nature of Whiting's residency, he 
did not own or lease the premises. Id. at 359, 885 A.2d at 800. 
However, Whiting claimed that because he developed the ability to 
exclude others by placing a lock on the bedroom door, he had control 
over the premises, thereby fulfilling the requirements necessary to 
possess an expectation of privacy. Id. at 359-60, 885 A.2d at 800. 
Conversely, the trial court negated Whiting's reasoning stating that, 
sharing an abandoned premises with four or more strangers cannot 
possibly constitute control over a premises. Id. at 360-61, 885 A.2d 
800-01. Lastly, Whiting argued that by not acknowledging his 
expectation of privacy, the State was discriminating against indigents 
who cannot afford a place of their own. Id. at 362, 885 A.2d at 802. 
However, the Court disregarded Whiting's arguments, explaining that 
the financial situation of individuals was not at issue and thus not 
applicable to the case at hand. Id. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed the intermediate court's decision in holding that 
although Whiting may have possessed a subjective expectation of 
privacy, that expectation was not objectively reasonable or one that 
society was willing or ready to recognize. !d. 
In evaluating a person's ability to seek protection under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court creates a clear delineation of who may, and 
who may not assert those rights. The Court draws a fine line 
distinguishing the difference between the requisite objectively 
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reasonable expectation of privacy of which society is aware and 
willing to recognize, and that of a mere subjective expectation that is 
only cognizant and applicable to the particular individual. By creating 
this distinction, the Court has followed a historical analysis that gives 
a surprisingly narrow interpretation of an Amendment that has been 
traditionally broad and expansive. Nevertheless, by limiting standing 
to those who possess an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, 
the Court has reinforced a premise the Constitution created, in that, 
while people shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
that freedom will not come at the cost of individuals taking advantage 
of it by seeking protection for illegal acts such as trespassing. 
